I recently submitted a research proposal on consent in sexual ethics, which draws from phenomenology and philosophy of emotion. You can read more about it below!
The Ethics of Intimacy: Toward an Affective Model of Consent
Abstract
Recent debates in feminist philosophy have expressed growing dissatisfaction with the dominant understanding of consent as a form of permission. While some have responded by supplementing consent with additional normative criteria for ethical intimate encounters, others have explored the possibility of reconceptualizing consent itself. The project pursues this latter strategy by developing an account of consent as affective approval: a sui generis emotion experienced upon recognizing something as right. On this view, consent is not primarily a speech act or a decision, but a form of emotive endorsement, which should not be confused with enthusiasm or desire.
In addition, the project develops an explicit account of consensual intimate encounters as joint activities grounded in affective approval, drawing on the broader literature on collective and joint intentionality. On this basis, it articulates the reciprocal duties that, within the affective model of consent, govern consensual encounters; namely, the duties of partners to perceive one another’s affective approval and to support each other’s capacity to reflect on what feels right and worthwhile.
The guiding hypothesis is that, taken together, this reconceptualization and its emphasis on relational norms make it possible to overcome the limitations of prevailing models of consent while preserving its normative centrality within sexual ethics.
In addition, from a historical-philosophical perspective, I am interested in advancing a novel interpretation of Husserl’s ethics that highlights its sentimentalist and consequentialist elements.